The Role of Local Actors in Social Protection in Crisis Contexts:
ANNEX COMPENDIUM

Synthesis Report: Annex Compendium

APRIL 2025

Implemented by
DAI
Shaping a more livable world.

In collaboration with
the sharetrust

The Social Protection Technical Assistance, Advice and Resources (STAAR) facility is a joint initiative of FCDO's Better Assistance in Crises (BASIC) and Gender Responsive Social Protection (GSP) programmes (funded by UKAid). STAAR materials do not necessarily represent FCDO's own views or policies or commit FCDO to any particular course of action.

Contents

ANNEX A: CONCEPTUAL FRAMING 3
ANNEX B: APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY 5
ANNEX C: COUNTRY SOCIAL PROTECTION CONTEXTS 10
ANNEX D: COUNTRY SP FOCUS PROGRAMMES 13
ANNEX E: SUMMARY OF COUNTRY-SPECIFIC FINDINGS 15
ANNEX F: PRIORITIES FOR SUPPORT 20
ANNEX G: AGENCY TABLES AND DIAGRAMS 22

ANNEX A: CONCEPTUAL FRAMING

Overview

This section describes the conceptual framing for the study. It was designed to analyse the relationship between local actors and social protection (SP) systems in each of the six deep dive countries and specifically to unpack:

- **The social protection system processes** e.g., policy and programme framing, design, delivery, monitoring and evaluation;
- **The social protection system building blocks** or component activities (see *Table A1)*.
- **The current and potential roles of diverse local actors** and their level of agency across the social protection processes and building blocks in different country contexts;
- **The role of local GESI actors, including GESI actors,** in delivering GESI SP outcomes; and
- **The role of local actors in SP** in different contexts, including crisis contexts.

Assessing Local Actor Roles

The Social Protection System framework defines a set of processes and building blocks for delivering social protection. This was used to help integrate local actors into the key phases/processes (policy, design, delivery) of the COVID-19 response and was further refined in the paper "*Social Protection as a Solar System*." The building blocks identified in this framework provide the foundational elements for unpacking the actual and potential role of local actors in this paper (see *Box 1)*.

This study adapts the existing social protection systems framework and was designed to assess the current and potential roles that local actors could play across the system, specifically framing the role of local actors across the four social protection processes (**framing, design, delivery, and learning**) and the building blocks (see *Table A1)*:

Table A1: Social Policy Processes and Building Blocks

FRAMING	DESIGN	DELIVERY	LEARNING
Developing policy and programme objectives	Developing targeting criteria	Awareness raising and advocacy	Designing M & E tools and indicators
Establishing governance & coordination	Designing conditionality of assistance	Beneficiary registration & verification	M & E data collection and analysis
Mapping locations, risk & vulnerability	Deciding beneficiary entitlement	Service delivery e.g., assistance distribution	M & E reporting
Deciding SP priorities	Deciding on transfer processes	Managing and setting up digital transfers	Collecting beneficiary feedback

Box A1: The SP System Conceptual Framework



Source: Barca & Jaramillo Mejia (2023)

Note: the "Solar System" has been adapted for the purposes of this study, which identifies the SP programming processes as "framing, design, delivery, and learning"

Mapping Current and Potential Levels of Local Actor Agency

In addition to gathering data on the roles of local actors, data was gathered on the agency of diverse local actors across the four functions and different building blocks. Strengthening the role of local actors in social protection systems and enabling local actor agency across key processes and building blocks is a process of shifting agency dynamics in specific contexts. To help take stock of the actual and potential agency of diverse local actors (i.e., how local actors are being involved and how they could be potentially involved) and to enable a more granular and operational understanding, the deep dives drew upon a tailored "*Spectrum of Local Actor Agency Framework*" developed by the Share Trust in conjunction with OECD. The refined spectrum identifies four levels of agency across functions/SP building blocks (*see Table A1*).

Table A2: Local Actor Agency Spectrum

Agency Level (& score)	**Level of Agency**	**Explanation**
A (10-12)	**Primarily responsible**	Local actors lead (including women's organisations), take decisions, and actions independently.
B (7-9)	**Co-responsible**	Local actors are part of a formal system and processes to either take decisions jointly or independently.
C (4-6)	**Consulted**	Local actors receive timely information on policies/ strategies/ programmes and engage in dialogue after consultation with their own constituents
D (0-3)	**Omitted**	Local actors are unaware of opportunities for engagement and support (i.e., funding).

10-12	**Primarily responsible**	**7-9**	**Co-responsible**	**4-6**	**Consulted**	**0-3**	**Omitted**

ANNEX B: APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY

Study Methodology

The Study was led by The Share Trust, with support from STAAR and FCDO.

Phase I: Inception Activities (April 2024 – August 2025)

The *Inception Phase* involved clarifying the working definitions (see *Box B1),* confirming the scope of the study, refining the research questions, and developing the conceptual framing for the study. A high-level desk-based review was carried out to understand the current state of play, including the role of local actors in social protection, as well as barriers and opportunities for strengthening their role in social protection programming. This involved a global desk review of the literature and global high-level key informant interviews.

Box B1: Working Definitions

LOCAL ACTORS: local actors were defined in the broadest sense - individuals, businesses, community based organisations and members, institutions, networks, national and subnational governments - based and operating within the local context of reference, subject to local laws, and whose activities are centred on local communities.

For this study, the focus was on three primary categories of local actors: i) government actors; ii) local NGOs (LNGOs); and iii) community- based organisations (CBOs):

- **Government actors:** this category includes: i) national or federal non-GESI focused government departments and or ministries e.g., ministries of social protection, health, etc; ii) GESI focused ministries or national government departments e.g., for women, children, people with disabilities; iii) subnational government departments; and iv) community government officers such as chiefs, traditional leaders or village leaders.
- **Local NGOs (LNGOs):** local NGOs as defined as either national or subnational non-governmental organisations, with (where possible) a legal registration status in the country of operation. LNGOs include gender and social inclusion (GESI) focused NGOs, for example women's organisations, organisations for people with disabilities (OPDs) as well as non-GESI focused NGOs. This category excludes international actors who have registered their organisations in the countries of study.
- **Community-based organisations (CBOs):** these are informal and mostly non-registered non-governmental grassroots entities that are established and operated by local community members e.g., Self Help Groups, youth groups etc. They typically have a smaller scope and operate at the neighbourhood or village level.

Within these three groups, local GESI Actors are either: i) *national government actors* e.g., ministries responsible for women, children, and social affairs; iii) *subnational government actors* e.g., sub-national level officers, women traditional leaders; iii) *national NGOs* focusing on, or representing women and other marginalised groups e.g., women's rights organisations, disabled people's organisations; and iv) *non-government community-based organisations* e.g., women's Self Help groups, youth groups, women's committee, grassroots OPDs. However, for the purposes of this study, **local GESI actors is used for non-governmental GESI actors** only with women's ministries grouped under "government actors."

SOCIAL PROTECTION SYSTEMS: are organised frameworks designed to provide support to individuals and households, helping them manage risks and shocks, reduce poverty, and improve their quality of life. These systems encompass a range of policies and programmes, including social assistance, social insurance, and labour market interventions, all aimed at

promoting social welfare and economic stability. Social protection systems encompass several components including:[1]

- **Management information systems (MIS):** digital platforms that collect, process, and manage data related to social protection programmes;
- **Social registries:** databases that consolidate information on potential beneficiaries, enabling effective targeting and coordination of social protection initiatives;
- **Payment systems:** mechanisms established to deliver monetary benefits to recipients, ensuring timely and secure transactions;
- **Grievance redress mechanisms:** structured processes that allow beneficiaries to lodge complaints or provide feedback about social protection programmes; and
- **Monitoring and evaluation (M & E) systems:** frameworks designed to assess the effectiveness and impact of social protection programmes.

Phase II: Country Deep Dive Activities *(September 2024 – February 2025)*

Following the *Inception Phase* and in close consultation with FCDO and STAAR, four deep dive countries in crisis contexts were selected (see *Box B2)*. The selection was based on a structured scoping process that considered multiple criteria to ensure diverse and meaningful analysis of the role of local actors in social protection systems. The key selection criteria included a mix of political economy contexts, prioritisation of countries within FCDO priority listing, the presence of strong social protection and humanitarian cash transfer (HCT) programmes, the availability of highly rated local researchers, and existing partnerships with The Share Trust, STAAR or FCDO.

A balance between crisis and stable contexts was essential. Countries with strong Share Trust, STAAR, or FCDO partner relationships were given preference to leverage existing collaborations and ensure impactful research outcomes. Each country met several of the selection criteria, ensuring that the research findings would be comprehensive and applicable across different social protection models, governance structures, and humanitarian contexts. The final selection also factored in recommendations from global key informants, further validating the choices based on practical experience and expertise in the field.

Box B2: Deep Dive Countries

1. **Afghanistan**
2. **Lebanon**
3. **Myanmar**
4. **Sudan**

The purpose of *Phase 2* was to carry out a deep dive in each of the selected countries to unpack the current and potential role of local actors in social protection systems in crisis contexts and the potential to enhance GESI outcomes.

Each country deep dive drew from the conceptual framework developed in *Phase 1* (see *Annex A),* and included a desk review, a survey, and key informant interviews with relevant stakeholders. Local researchers were engaged to lead the country deep dive primary research with The Share Trust working closely to provide ongoing support, guide deep dive planning, and develop the research tools (see *Box B3)*.

[1] Source: Lindert *et al.*, (2020).

Box B3: Local Researchers

The Country deep dive was carried out by local researchers, one in each of the selected countries:

- **Afghanistan:** Seema Massumi
- **Lebanon:** Rima Al Mokdad
- **Myanmar:** Lal Fakmawii
- **Sudan:** Hassan-Alattar Satti

Country Desk-Based Reviews

These comprised a review of the available literature and scoping interviews to identify: i) existing social protection programmes implemented by different actors (e.g., non-state actors, governments) (see *Annex C)*; ii) social protection policies and legal frameworks; and iii) identification/mapping of key social protection stakeholders (see *individual country reports)*. At the end of the desk review, two social protection programmes in each deep dive and associated stakeholders were identified for more intensive review (see *Annex D)*.

Table B1: Desk Based Review Focus

Area of Focus	Details
SP context	• **High level review of SP context** e.g., SP laws, SP programmes and role of diverse local actors in policy and programme framing, design, delivery, and learning
SP programmes & stakeholders	• **Map existing key SP programmes** (all major country programmes) - highlighting good practices in relation to local actor involvement • **High-level mapping of all key SP stakeholders**
Identification & review of focus SP programmes	• **Identification of two priority SP programmes** to focus primary research on • **Identification of key informants associated with the programme** (and local actors that could play a role) • **Review of project literature & reports**

Country Key Informant Interviews (KII)

In total 71 KIIs were completed across the four countries with a range of key actors linked to the selected social protection programmes including: 20 KIIs with international actors, 7 with government actors, 25 with local NGOs, and 4 with CBOs. In addition, 15 KIIs were conducted with local non-governmental GESI actors specifically.

Table B2: Number of Key informant interviews

Actor type	Afghanistan	Sudan	Myanmar	Lebanon	TOTAL
International actors	6	6	3	5	20
Government actors	5	2	0	0	7
Local NGOs	10	4	10	1	25
CBOs	0	0	3	1	4
Local GESI actors (NGOs & CBOs)	4	3	6	2	15
TOTAL	25	15	22	9	71

Table B3: Research Questions for Social Protection Focus Programmes

Issue	Examples of Learning Questions
Local actor roles & agency (actual/potential)	**To what extent do different local actors currently have agency** in SP policy/programme framing/design, delivery, monitoring, evaluation, accountability & learning? **How does this map against local actor preferences** in terms of their roles/agency?
Challenges	**What are the challenges to strengthening local actor agency/roles in social protection programming** (i.e., framing, design, delivery, learning)? • *e.g., resource constraints, capacity and skills gaps, power dynamics, marginalisation, policy and institutional barriers, behavioural barriers, underlying norms*
Contextual influence	**How do local contextual parameters** - including crisis contexts - constrain local actor agency/roles in SP systems including humanitarian cash transfers? • *e.g., political economy, gender norms and dynamics, legal and policy frameworks, governance* **Can local actors support more effective SP systems in crisis contexts?** (e.g., more responsive, timely, cost-effectiveness, culturally sensitive, inclusive with increased reach, gender-responsive/transformative, accountable to local communities, sustainable, more impactful)
GESI outcomes	**How have local actors - including GESI actors -** supported gender-responsive and socially inclusive social protection PROCESSES? • *i) framing & design (e.g., advocacy & awareness, inclusion & engagement; ii) delivery (e.g., data collection & analysis, inclusion & engagement); iii) monitoring, evaluation & learning* **How have local actors - including women's organisations** - supported gender-responsive and socially inclusive social protection OUTCOMES?
Enablers	**What are the opportunities, enablers, and priorities** for strengthening the role of local actors in social protection? • *e.g., capacity sharing, shifting power, shifting funding, shifting processes, addressing underlying norms, policies & legal frameworks, enhancing coordination & collaboration* **What are the opportunities, enablers, and priorities** for strengthening local actor agency/engagement for more INCLUSIVE social protection systems moving forward? **What are the opportunities, enablers, and priorities** for strengthening local actor agency/engagement in SP systems in DIFFERENT CONTEXTS?

Country Survey

In total, 24 surveys were administered across 3 countries (no surveys were conducted in Lebanon due to the security situation at the time of this study) including 8 with international actors and 16 with local actors. The survey used the *Local Actor Agency Spectrum* presented above to rate the level of agency of different local actors across different social protection building blocks. International actors who responded to the survey were asked to rate the agency levels of different local actors while local actors rated their own levels of agency in relation to the selected social protection programmes. The survey responses were analysed through taking the average of different local actor scores per country.

Study Limitations

» **Challenges administering the surveys in some contexts**. For example, in Lebanon, due to the security situation and sensitivity of exchanging online information at the time of data collection, surveys were not conducted.

» **Challenges conducting face to face interviews**. In Lebanon, Myanmar, Sudan and Afghanistan, the security challenges hindered face to face interviews due to access challenges especially with local/sub-national government actors and community-based organisations. This prompted utilisation of virtual interviews with some key stakeholders. Where virtual interviews were not possible, especially in Lebanon and Sudan, the target number of key informants was not reached, and the findings are based on the available data. To mitigate this challenge, a robust desk review was conducted to compliment the lack of key informants

» **Risks with direct interviews**. In crisis contexts for instance in Myanmar and Afghanistan, there were significant risks with direct interviews with local actors, prompting the use of virtual interviews to allow primary data collection but without putting the local actors at risk.

» **Government actors.** It was challenging to integrate government actor respondents into the research in Myanmar and Afghanistan. In Myanmar, government actors were not interviewed, and the researcher relied on international actor respondents who provided context and information about government related activities in social protection programming. In Afghanistan, DfA staff generally have limited experience of the SP sector and in some cases were not allowed to speak to outsiders without senior leadership permission.

» **Lebanon crisis.** The unfolding crisis in Lebanon during the time of data collection led to significant delays in starting the study in the country. In addition, as a result of these delays and the extremely difficult situation, the local researcher was not able to comprehensively reach the target number of key informant interviews and most of the intended respondents were hesitant to participate in the interviews or complete the survey citing security concerns. These issues affected the depth of information that could be collected in Lebanon and instead a desk-based review approach was prioritised with a limited number of key informant interviews.

» **Social assistance focus.** Stakeholders selected for the key informant interviews and surveying were generally linked to two focus programmes in each country. These programmes were primarily focused on social assistance rather than social security, reflecting the need in these crisis contexts to provide urgent resources and in some cases a response to the collapse of basic services. As a result, there were no key informant interviews with several key social protection stakeholders, for example employers/employee organisations; and the study findings should be interpreted accordingly.

ANNEX C: COUNTRY SOCIAL PROTECTION CONTEXTS

This section summarises the social protection context for the six selected deep-dive countries.

Table C1: Social Protection Highlights Per Country

AFGHANISTAN

Afghanistan has experienced conflict and periods of fragility since 1978. Due to the constant change of regimes and policies, the country has an underdeveloped social support system given insufficient revenue and the high cost of wars undermining consistent funding. As a result, assistance has always been provided by the government and by the international funding community in the form of projects which are largely geographically targeted and crisis-focused.

Since August 2021, gaps in social safety nets have widened due to international sanctions imposed on the De-facto Authority (DfA) of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and the large-scale departure of highly educated individuals from the country. The financial sanctions imposed on Afghanistan by the international community have resulted in barriers to banking systems, restricted access to assets, and the cessation of funding for development projects that had created numerous jobs over the past 20 years.

The return of the Taliban to power in 2021 has severely impacted women's rights and social protections. Women and girls face significant restrictions, including bans from secondary education and many forms of employment. This regression has led to Afghanistan being rated as "very poor" in gender equality, with women subjected to forced pregnancies, childhood marriages, and other abuses.

KENYA

The Constitution of 2010 has played a crucial role in expanding opportunities for social protection in Kenya, while national social health reforms have been more challenging due to conflicting interests and institutional legacies. The implementation of national cash transfers has resulted in positive change including index-based livestock insurance for pastoralists, e.g., *the Kenya National Safety Net Programme (NSNP)* established in 2013 with benefits for household welfare including the elderly.

Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) supported programmes play a key role in the development of social protection. For example, *the Cash Transfer for Orphans and Vulnerable Children (CT-OCV), the Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP)* and *the Home-Grown School Meals Programme (HGSM).* INGOs and LNGOs provide complementary support, including cash transfers for crisis-affected households notably in arid and semi-arid counties.

Kenya has made strides in promoting gender equality through legislative reforms and policies aimed at enhancing women's rights. The 2010 Constitution guarantees equal rights for men and women, leading to increased representation of women in political spheres. However, challenges persist, particularly concerning gender-based violence (Musambi, 2024).

LEBANON

Lebanon's social protection landscape is profoundly shaped by prolonged economic instability, political fragility, and a growing humanitarian crisis. Since late 2019, Lebanon has been grappling with a severe and multifaceted economic and financial crisis, which the World Bank (2021) ranked among the most severe globally since the mid-19th century. This crisis emerged due to a halt in capital inflows, a banking sector collapse, and a drastic currency devaluation. The economic collapse has had widespread implications, affecting access to basic services, employment opportunities, and overall quality of life, alongside a sharp and widespread increase in poverty.

Before these crises, Lebanon's social protection system was characterised by fragmentation, lack of coordination, and limited coverage. Most of the existing social protection system was contributory and covered mostly public and formal sector workers. *The National Social Security Fund* (NSSF) was among the country's main operating social protection structures, providing social insurance to a limited segment of public sector and formal private sector employees through health insurance, family allowances, and end-of-service indemnities. *The Ministry of Social Affairs* (MoSA) and the *Presidency of the Council of Ministers* (PCM) introduced the *National Poverty Targeted Programme* (NPTP) in 2011, which targets the poorest and most at risk Lebanese households through a proxy-means testing approach.

Before 2019, the NPTP provided limited social assistance, including food e-cards, healthcare exemptions, and school registration support. In the face of multiple crises and the unprecedented number of Lebanese needing social and humanitarian assistance, the NPTP scaled from 15,000 cash-recipient households in 2020, to 36,000 in 2021, to around 75,000 in August 2023. The NPTP was effectively terminated in June 2024 due to the cessation of donor funding.

Lebanon has made some progress in gender equality, particularly in education, with a Gender Parity Index (GPI) of 0.91 as of 1985. However, women's participation in the workforce and political representation remains low. Social protection measures specific to women are limited, and cultural norms continue to influence gender roles, hindering substantial progress in gender equality (UN Women, 2024).

A key milestone was reached with the launch of a disability allowance under the National Disability Allowance (NDA) programme, offering a targeted monthly cash transfer to nearly 4,000 individuals with disabilities, including both Lebanese and refugee populations. This disability allowance served as a shock-responsive tool during the crisis and reflects the broader implementation of the country's National Social Protection Strategy, which is supported by international donors and agencies. Importantly, the government extended the NDA in September 2025, reinforcing the institutionalisation of long-term social assistance mechanisms amid Lebanon's ongoing socio-economic challenges.

MYANMAR

Prior to the current crisis, Myanmar had a solid social protection system that combined contributory and non-contributory schemes. However, as a result of the 2021 crisis, many initiatives have been discontinued or scaled back. The conflict resulting from the overthrow of the democratically elected government by the Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) has led to a growing humanitarian crisis, with 33% of the population in need of humanitarian assistance. The coup led to the suspension or cessation of most national level social protection programmes, with current SP programmes heavily geared towards meeting immediate humanitarian needs, as well as a halting of some social protection initiatives due to their presence in contested areas, budget cuts, or high staff turnover caused by civil disobedience.

This shift in the aid sector has forced many CSOs to redirect their activities, impacting their ability to pursue long-term social transformation goals. Local actors' sustainability is precarious due to financial challenges, the de Facto government's crackdown, and limited internal capacity.

Myanmar's political instability has adversely affected women's rights and access to social protection. The ongoing conflicts have led to increased reports of sexual violence, and women's participation in peace processes remains minimal. The country's gender equality rating has stagnated, with women facing challenges in accessing education and employment opportunities (Lederer, 2024).

NEPAL

The overarching framework for social protection in Nepal is the 2015 Constitution, which recognises social protection as a fundamental right, focused on reducing poverty, vulnerability and risk. Universal SP is regulated by the federal government and implemented by local governments.

Nepal's SP expenditure in the fiscal year 2018/19 was approximately 134.4 billion Nepalese rupee accounting for 3.9 % of the country's GDP.

SP is primarily implemented through labour market interventions, social insurance, and social assistance. For over a decade, the largest SP programmes have included cash transfers for senior citizens, single women, indigenous and endangered ethnic groups, and children under five years of age. Nearly 50% of the SP budget is allocated to old-age pensions, while only about 6% is directed toward child grants.

Nepal has implemented several initiatives to promote gender equality and social protection for women. Organisations including *Women for Human Rights* (WHR) have been instrumental in advocating for women's rights, leading to legislative changes that improve property rights and social security allowances. Despite these advancements, challenges remain, particularly in rural areas where traditional practices continue to impede full gender equality.

SUDAN

Since April 2023, Sudan has been embroiled in a civil war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), leading to a profound humanitarian crisis. The conflict has resulted in approximately 150,000 deaths and displaced over 14 million people, marking one of the worst displacement crises globally. The violence has severely disrupted essential services, with nearly 70% of medical facilities in conflict zones rendered inoperative, exacerbating the plight of civilians caught in the crossfire

The ongoing conflict has had a catastrophic impact on Sudan's social protection systems. Government institutions responsible for social support, such as the Ministry of Social Development and the Zakat Office, have become largely non-functional due to the war. As a result of the crisis, humanitarian organisations are major players in the social protection sector in Sudan. According to the Cash Working Group, 760,000 people benefited from the distribution of multi-purpose cash assistance (MPCA) in 2024 with a total budget of $36.8 million.

The conflict has also witnessed the emergence of many mutual aid groups that mobilise resources from within and outside the community to deliver relief services to conflict affected communities across Sudan. Grassroots initiatives, such as the establishment of over 600 Emergency Response Rooms (ERRs), have been pivotal in providing food, shelter, medical aid, and education to those affected by the conflict. Informal social protection is an integral part of the daily lives of communities, and it is practised by grassroot organisations irrespective of any social protection provided by the government or humanitarian actors.

Sudan's recent conflicts have exacerbated challenges to gender equality. Women have been disproportionately affected by violence, with reports indicating a 50% increase in conflict-related sexual violence in 2023. Social protection mechanisms are weak, and women's participation in peace negotiations is minimal, hindering progress toward gender equality.

ANNEX D: COUNTRY SOCIAL PROTECTION FOCUS PROGRAMMES

For each country, key government and internationally supported programmes were reviewed as part of the desk-based review, and two SP programmes were selected to help identify stakeholders for consultation. These focus programmes are summarised below. More limited information is provided for Myanmar because local actors requested anonymity as the information was considered sensitive at the time of the study.

Table D1: Focus Social Protection Programmes for the Study

Country	Initiative	Funding Partner	Project Lead	Other Key stakeholders	SP Focus	Target Group	Geographical Focus	Initiative length
Afghanistan	Social Protection for Returnees by Citizens Organisation for Advocacy & Resilience (COAR)	Global Forum for Food And Agriculture (GFFA)	Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC)	Directorate of Economy, money service providers, Directorate of refugees & returnees	Cash Transfer	4500 returnees from Pakistan and Iran	Kabul, Kunduz, Kandahar, Herat, Nangarhar	2025 to 2026
	Resilience Building Afghanistan Project	World Food Programme (WFP)	World Food Programme (WFP)	Local NGOs, local communities e.g., community shuras/councils	Resilience, food & livelihood activities	Ultra-poor	Balkh, Badghis, Kandahar	2024 (Ongoing)
Lebanon	National Disability Allowance (NDA)	European Union (EU)	Government	UNICEF, ILO	Cash	People with disabilities (Persons With Disabilities (PWD) (Refugees)	Nationwide	2023 - ongoing
	Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) Programme	World Bank	Government	WFP	Cash	Vulnerable households	Nationwide	2011-2024 (July)
Myanmar	Women and Girls Social Protection Programme	*Information not included as per respondent request*			Psychosocial support, capacity strengthening	Women and girls	Nationwide	*Information not shared*

Country	Initiative	Funding Partner	Project Lead	Other Key stakeholders	SP Focus	Target Group	Geographical Focus	Initiative length
	Disability Inclusive SP Programme	*Information not included as per respondent request*			Disability allowances (Cash)	Women and Children PWDs	Nationwide	*Information not shared*
Sudan	Mother and Child Cash Transfer Plus (MCCT+)	German government through KfW Development Bank	UNICEF	State Government	Cash & skills building	Pregnant women & mothers of young children, adolescent girls, vulnerable families	Kassal and Red Sea States	Started in 2021 (ongoing)
	Cash Consortium of Sudan	Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance (BHA), USAID, ECHO and FCDO	Mercy Corps	Cash consortium member agencies (international actors)	Cash	Vulnerable households	14 states in Sudan (Blue Nile, Central Darfur, Gedaref, Gezira, Kassala, Khartoum, North Darfur, North Kordofan, Sennar, South Darfur, South Kordofan, West Darfur, West Kordofan & White Nile)	Started in 2023 (ongoing)

ANNEX E: SUMMARY OF COUNTRY-SPECIFIC FINDINGS

This *Annex* provides country-specific findings including: *Table E1* summarising the actual and potential roles of diverse local actors across the four main social protection processes (framing, design, delivery, learning) in crisis contexts; and *Table E2* summarising the barriers facing local actors to implementing social protection in crisis contexts.

Table E1: Current and Potential Local Actor ROLES in Social Protection Programming by COUNTRY

Role	Framing	Design	Delivery	Learning
		AFGHANISTAN		
Current	**National government* is largely excluded** from framing international programmes due to lack of trust and donor-imposed restrictions **Local NGOs are consulted** in some aspects of framing but excluded from decision-making; feel their insights are often dismissed or diluted	**National government** is occasionally **consulted** on geographical prioritisation but not involved in core design decisions **Subnational government actors are sometimes consulted** for targeting and mapping of vulnerable areas, particularly in health and education sectors. **Local NGOs are co-responsible in designing SP programmes**, especially around delivery mechanisms in rural areas	**National government is primarily responsible** for smaller aid initiatives using local offices and community leaders **Subnational government actors** are **co-responsible** in delivering aid and mobilising local communities in some provinces under DfA coordination **Local NGOs** are **primarily responsible** in beneficiary registration and work with mobile service providers to navigate a broken banking system	**Subnational government actors** are **co-responsible** for monitoring, but credibility is questioned by civil society actors due to lack of transparency **Local NGOs are omitted by international monitoring** systems or third-party contractors
Potential	**National government*** has potential to be **primarily responsible** if policies and political openness shift **Subnational government actors** could be **co-responsible** agents for framing if better engagement frameworks with INGOs are created **Local NGOs** have strong appetite to be **primarily responsible** in framing if political space and partnerships are supportive **CBOs** could be **co-responsible** in developing localised priorities for SP,	**Subnational government actors** have practical capacity be **co-responsible** in designing national frameworks for district-level realities **Local NGOs** could be **primarily responsible** in holistic programme design if funding flows are stabilised, and international confidence increases **CBOs** are well placed to be **consulted** in localised targeting mechanisms and delivery schedules based on seasonal and community-specific data	**National government** could take **primary responsibility** for delivery of international SP programmes with political changes. **Subnational government actors** could be **primarily responsible** in outreach and mobilisation due to their involvement and experience with past programmes **Local NGOs** are already **primarily responsible** for delivery but could further scale delivery operations to underserved areas, particularly with direct donor support and flexible compliance	**National government** could be **primarily responsible** for M&E with international oversight, provided governance structures improve, and transparency is enforced **Subnational government actors** could take **primary responsibility** on localised M&E with oversight and capacity building, particularly if political constraints ease **Local NGOs** are willing and able be **primarily responsible** for **M&E** reporting if resourced and formally included in programme cycles

	especially in conservative areas where access is restricted			
LEBANON**				
Current	**National government plays more of a procedural convening role** than a substantive policy leader due to institutional weaknesses **Local NGOs are Invited post-decision for consultations**, limiting their ability to influence the direction of SP policy	**National government contributed to** NDA programme design (eligibility, oversight), but had minimal influence over donor-led programmes like ESSN **Local NGOs** played **significant roles** in design of NDA to ensure accessibility, but largely excluded from ESSN design led by international actors	**National government coordinates** SP delivery through private financial providers but has limited capacity to manage quality or ensure access **Local NGOs** roles are mainly **limited** to awareness-raising and feedback; not formally involved in direct service provision **Some CBOs like OPDs have played crucial outreach** roles in making SP accessible to marginalised populations	**National government** handles **record updates** and basic verification, but lacks systems for comprehensive tracking or impact analysis **CBOs** provide **informal** feedback but are not integrated into structured reporting systems
Potential	**National government** could transition to a **strategic role** by embedding technical units (e.g., gender, disability) into SP policy design **Local NGOs** could **lead** structured evidence generation and coordinate grassroots consultation before policies are framed **CBOs** could be **integrated** into formal SP planning to ensure community-level risks and needs are addressed early	**Local NGOs** could **co-lead** design processes, particularly for inclusion-sensitive elements like disability or age verification **CBOs** could serve as **conveners** and evidence providers, particularly for gender-sensitive programmes like the NDA	With donor and MoSA support, **LNGOs roles** could be **included** in delivery consortia to provide both outreach and implementation **CBOs** could formally **lead** awareness and communication strategies, improving programme access and reach	**National government** could **lead** community-led monitoring by working closely with OPDs to embed feedback into programme governance With targeted training, **Local NGOs could co-design** and manage M&E systems aligned to local needs and realities With proper integration, **CBOs** could **lead** beneficiary feedback loops and improve programme responsiveness through real-time data
MYANMAR				
Current	**National government*** is **omitted in framing** as the dual governance of the SAC and NUG has fragmented social protection leadership, with limited legitimacy to coordinate comprehensive national frameworks **Local NGOs** are **consulted** occasionally but excluded from real decision-making; framing tends to follow pre-set international agendas	**Government actors** are largely **omitted** from programme design, partly due to international actors' reluctance to legitimise SAC and structural dysfunction within the state **Local NGOs** are **primarily responsible** for community-level design activities like targeting, especially where INGOs lack contextual understanding **CBOs** are occasionally **consulted** on practical adaptations, such as how to	**Local NGOs** are **primarily responsible** for outreach and service delivery, particularly through women's groups and in areas inaccessible to international actors **CBOs** are often **primarily responsible** on actual delivery of services, especially via women-led collectives and village savings groups	**Local NGOs** are mainly **consulted** under donor-designed systems, with limited control over indicators or data analysis **CBOs** are **consulted** in collecting community feedback**,** but typically lack tools or channels for structured reporting

	CBOs are only **consulted** with their input often marginalised in final programme frameworks	define vulnerability or adjust delivery to cultural norms		
Potential	**National government** could be **primarily responsible** in institutionalising inclusive policy frameworks with grassroots input **Local NGOs** have the potential to take **primary responsibility** in objectives-setting and risk mapping. **CBOs** could be **primarily responsible** in identifying needs and framing priorities, particularly in marginalised ethnic regions	**Local NGOs** can potentially be **co-responsible** in translating community priorities into structured design proposals and work directly with donors if supported **CBOs** could assume **primary responsibility in development of adaptive transfer mechanisms,** such as in-kind aid or mobile transfers, in low-infrastructure zones	**Local NGOs** have the networks, trust, and flexibility to expand their **primary responsibility** in end-to-end delivery, especially if provided with long-term funding and compliance support **CBOs** could be **primarily responsible** for scaling locally relevant and resilient delivery systems in high-risk or inaccessible areas	**Local NGOs** have potential to take **primary responsibility** in full M&E processes - designing indicators, tools, and analysing results - if investments are made in MEAL capacity **CBOs** could be **primarily responsible** for real-time feedback collection and help co-develop indicators grounded in local experience
SUDAN				
Current	**National government*** is currently **omitted** in SP framing due to donor restrictions that prohibit official engagement with the government **Local NGOs** are often **consulted** only for validation, which limits their influence and alignment of programmes with community needs **CBOs** like Emergency Response Rooms independently take **primary responsibility** in framing their own SP initiatives using diaspora funds, demonstrating grassroots ownership	**National government** via ministries is **primarily responsible** in setting eligibility and delivery structures, but usually **omitted** or occasionally **consulted** in donor-funded projects **Subnational government actors** are **co-responsible** in making localised decisions such as transfer frequency or implementation logistics, though their involvement is project-dependent and inconsistent **Local NGOs** are often **co-responsible** for developing targeting criteria and transfer modalities, especially in areas where international actors rely on them for access and logistics	**The national government is co-responsible** for delivery but in reality, only has a supervisory role due to insecurity and donor restrictions **Local NGOs** are **primarily responsible** in delivering aid, particularly in hard-to-reach conflict zones; their frontline access and flexibility surpass that of international actors. **CBOs** are often **co-responsible** in delivery, working with LNGOs, particularly in insecure regions where their deep-rooted presence provides both trust and access	**Government actors** through ministries such as health and education take **primary responsibility** in monitoring their sectoral SP interventions, including health centre performance in programmes like MCCT+, though systems lack strong accountability loops **Subnational actors** are **primarily responsible** for handling complaint mechanisms and local follow-up, though tools and resources for systematic M&E remain limited **CBOs** are **co-responsible** in collecting informal feedback from beneficiaries and pass it along, though not yet integrated into formal M&E systems
Potential	**Subnational government actors** could be **co-responsible** in framing and location prioritisation due to their frontline positioning and contextual familiarity, especially in states like Eastern Sudan **LNGOs** see themselves as **co-responsible** in SP framing, especially in governance and location selection,	**Local NGOs** could be **primarily responsible** for developing relevant, inclusive SP programme design as they have deep operational insight and community trust **CBOs** could be **primarily responsible** for defining locally relevant eligibility and delivery mechanisms, particularly in areas	**Subnational government actors** expressed readiness to assume **primary responsibility** in delivery, particularly in conflict-affected zones where they maintain informal local legitimacy **CBOs** could be **co-responsible** in delivery even without formal registration	**National government**, through ministries could take **primary responsibility** of **institutionalising community feedback mechanisms** and ensuring accountability in SP **Subnational government actors** could be **primarily responsible** for community-based monitoring systems to improve

provided partnerships are strengthened and their voices respected **CBOs** could be **co-responsible** for developing SP priorities based on community dialogue and needs	where formal actors have limited access or trust		responsiveness and facilitate real-time programme adaptation **LNGOs** could take **primary responsibility** on defining indicators, collecting data, and analysing impact, making M&E more contextually grounded

*Or "*de facto authorities"* in this case
**It was not possible to carry out a survey in Lebanon, so scoring levels using the *Local Actor Agency Framework* are not used.

Table E2: Key Local Actor BARRIERS for Local Actors by COUNTRY

Political	Institutional	Coordination	Financial	Conflict settings
AFGHANISTAN				
DfA interference: authorities demand project-by-project approvals (MoU) and sometimes request employment of their affiliates, delaying projects and undermining neutrality **Gender-based restrictions**: the regime's rollback of women's rights - including bans on female education and employment - effectively excludes WLOs and women-led programming from formal SP systems	**Loss of institutional capacity**: "brain drain" following regime change has left local governance bodies and CSOs with inexperienced staff and weakened technical capacity **Opaque government systems**: DfA ministries operate without transparency, making collaboration on SP monitoring, reporting, and coordination nearly impossible	**INGO-dominated processes**: INGOs and donors often bypass local actors in design and decision-making, citing security and compliance concerns **Limited trust networks**: few mechanisms exist for structured engagement or trust-building between local NGOs and international agencies, limiting collaboration	**Dependence on INGOs for funding**: local actors rarely receive direct funding; financial flows are managed by international intermediaries, restricting autonomy **Banking dysfunctions**: cash liquidity issues and sanctions create major hurdles for disbursement, especially in rural areas without banking access	**Inaccessible regions**: active conflict in many provinces restricts international access, pushing local NGOs into high-risk frontline delivery without adequate support **Donor reluctance to engage DfA**: security and reputational concerns lead to underutilisation of existing government infrastructure, even when technically functional
LEBANON				
Clientelist political economy: SP programming can be shaped by political party interests, undermining its function as a universal right and introducing bias into targeting and delivery **Weak government ownership**: ministries such as MoSA often	**Limited SP knowledge base**: government and local CSOs lack in-depth understanding of SP systems, impeding meaningful policy dialogue and innovation **Paper-based systems**: MoSA's lack of digital infrastructure hinders programme tracking, monitoring, and	**Fragmentation among local actors**: CSOs and WLOs often work in isolation due to historical competition for funding, limiting their collective influence **Lack of engagement platforms**: there is no formalised system for integrating OPDs, WLOs, or	**Indirect funding flows**: local actors often depend on UN agencies or INGOs for access to funds, creating layers of bureaucracy and reducing direct accountability to communities **Lack of sustainable financing**: SP programmes like the NDA are	**Crisis-layered vulnerabilities**: the ongoing economic collapse, combined with political instability and regional spillovers (e.g., from Syria), creates multi-dimensional risks for SP effectiveness **Beneficiary exclusion**: due to weak outreach and verification,

engage in SP not out of strategic commitment, but for financial incentives, weakening programme coherence and ambition	knowledge retention across programme cycles	community actors into national SP design and review	project-based and rely on temporary donor funding, reducing long-term impact and continuity	marginalised groups like women with disabilities remain under-registered and under-served by SP initiatives

MYANMAR

Restrictive NGO registration laws: the 2022 *Organisation Registration Law* requires all CSOs to register with the military regime and gain approval for funding and activities, fostering surveillance and political control over SP work **Overlapping governance systems**: multiple parallel authorities (SAC, NUG, ethnic armed organisations) result in contradictory or redundant SP policies, increasing confusion and reducing efficiency	**Weak post-project sustainability**: many SP projects end without follow-up mechanisms, leading to the collapse of structures like self-help groups (SHGs) after initial funding ceases **Fragmented national SP frameworks**: SP initiatives are often short-term and donor-driven, with no coherent national vision or coordination across sectors or regions	**Top-down project design**: INGOs frequently present pre-packaged project frameworks, offering local NGOs little opportunity to shape SP interventions from the ground up **Lack of structured platforms**: Myanmar lacks institutionalised mechanisms for engaging civil society in SP, preventing coordinated dialogue among actors	**Banking and compliance hurdles**: local organisations face challenges in financial transactions due to strict donor compliance standards and weak banking infrastructure, especially in conflict zones **High inflation**: the *Kyat's* devaluation (approx. 70% since 2021) has significantly undermined purchasing power, affecting the feasibility of SP delivery	**Fragmented access**: armed conflict restricts movement and service delivery; INGOs often rely on local partners to access conflict-affected regions **Rising operational costs**: due to war-disrupted supply chains and inflation, the cost of delivering aid has surged, squeezing programme budgets

SUDAN

Government restrictions and interference: bureaucratic barriers such as unclear registration rules, prevent local NGOs from registering or operating in conflict-affected cities like Omdurman, limiting their ability to engage in SP efforts **Fragmented state authority**: multiple *de facto authorities* and unstable governance structures create confusion over jurisdiction, complicating coordination and SP policy development	**Restrictive digital tool policies**: local authorities in some areas prohibit the use of standard data collection tools (e.g., Kobo), undermining efficient monitoring and learning systems **Capacity gaps in local actors**: national NGOs often lack the communication, fundraising, and analytical skills needed to secure funding or engage meaningfully in programme design	**Power asymmetries with INGOs**: Local NGOs report that INGOs dominate programme design decisions, limiting local ownership and influence over SP priorities **Siloed local NGO operations**: competition for funding has weakened collaboration among CSOs, reducing the impact of collective advocacy for improved SP systems	**Emergency-based funding cycles**: SP initiatives are almost exclusively funded through short-term emergency relief budgets, leaving little room for strategic planning or sustainability **Currency devaluation**: hyperinflation and currency instability erode donor funds' value, severely limiting the ability of local actors to deliver consistent services	**Restricted access to communities**: the conflict has created no-go zones for international actors, making local NGOs the only viable option for service delivery, yet they are underfunded and under-supported **Operational insecurity**: the volatile security context delays or disrupts SP implementation and creates major risks for both staff and beneficiaries

ANNEX F: COUNTRY-SPECIFIC PRIORITIES FOR SUPPORT

This *Annex* summarises country-specific opportunities for supporting the agency of different local actors in social protection identified by local key informants.

Table F1: Summary of Country Specific Technical Assistance Requests by Diverse Local Actors

Local Actor Type	Key Opportunities
	AFGHANISTAN
Youth organisations	• **Support capacity strengthening on social project (SP) programmes**. Young men and women could be trained online (women have difficulty attending in person training) and youth can be involved in consultation phases of the projects, community delivery, and monitoring programmes
Local NGOs	• **Support SP related awareness and capacity strengthening** for senior staff on project management, community work, and monitoring mechanisms • **Involve LNGOs in SP policy framing** dialogues in order to leverage their local-level knowledge
	LEBANON
National Government (MoSA)	• **Provide capacity strengthening for government technical units** e.g., the gender unit, disability unit, and subnational social Development Centres (SDCs) into the policy and programme development cycle for social protection programmes. • **Support the establishment of regular consultation platforms** with CSOs, OPDs, and WLOs at every stage (from policy framing to design, delivery, and evaluation) • **Strengthen coordination of national government with SDCs** in order to improve their role in outreach, beneficiary engagement, and local delivery of SP programmes • **Support to develop a national M&E and data system** that directly captures and reflects input from local actors, allowing for real-time tracking of programme performance and more adaptive management
Subnational government actors (SDC)	• **Provide capacity strengthening to improve technical understanding** of SP programming, particularly around outreach, local coordination, and their role in the delivery of the NDA and ESSN • **Provide operational tools and resources** to fulfil their role in facilitating beneficiary engagement, community awareness, and grievance redress mechanisms linked to SP programmes • **Support capacity strengthening on how to apply gender-responsive and disability-inclusive approaches** in outreach, targeting, and grievance handling to ensure services meet the needs of women and people with disabilities
Local NGOs	• **Support technical capacity strengthening on SP policy analysis**, participatory programme design, and monitoring, with a focus on ensuring that both disability and gender inclusion are fully embedded • **Facilitate access to government data** to allow civil society to conduct independent research and evidence-based advocacy on SP programmes

MYANMAR	
CBOs including Self Help Groups (SHGs) & Village Savings Groups (VSLAs)	• **Support nationwide coordination to bridge township-level organisations** with oversees development assistance (ODA) and other resources. • **Provide technical assistance for vocational income opportunities** and caregiver/family education • **Support development of user-friendly disability registration systems** for cash transfers and social protection programmes • **Provide capital injections to enable internal group loans and support group enterprises**, such as: poultry farming and egg sales, collective trading of rice and other commodities for village consumption and market sales, and cooperative farming of cash crops • **Offer training programmes to develop skills in financial management**, leadership, conflict resolution, and project management empowering SHG members to manage their groups more effectively and navigate the complexities of operating in crisis environments • **Helping CBOs attain legal status** to facilitate access to funding opportunities and resources, thereby enhancing their operational capacity • **Support investment in communication tools and technologies** to help groups maintain internal cohesion and coordinate activities, even amidst infrastructural challenges • **Help implement community-led mental health and psychosocial support services** to address the psychological impacts of conflict and instability on SHG and VSLA members for their resilience and well-being • **Provide guidance on personal safety, conflict de-escalation, and emergency preparedness** to help members protect themselves in volatile environments. • **Facilitate connections between SHGs and VSLA with larger networks or coalitions** to amplify their voices, enhance advocacy efforts, and provide platforms for sharing resources and best practices • **Provide flexible funding to support both immediate humanitarian needs and long-term organisational strengthening.** • **Provide remote or decentralised training in governance and financial management** to help groups adapt to displacement challenges. • **Implementing crisis-responsive savings mechanisms**, such as mobile banking or pooled emergency funds, to ensure financial stability for displaced members. • **Provide guidance on psychosocial support and conflict-sensitive approaches** to help rebuild trust and enable groups to continue operations despite ongoing instability
SUDAN	
Local NGOs	• **Prepare a targeted and predetermined capacity strengthening plan for the national NGOs working in SP** in areas such as fundraising, reporting, financial management, context analysis, presentation skills, M&E, outreach, and public relations • **Support national NGOs in developing policies** to be eligible for more funding • **Help institutionalise the roles of local NGOs** in SP in national social protection policies
Subnational government	• **Support increased involvement in decision making** forums of internationally funded SP programme
CBOs	• **Facilitate the formalisation of grassroots women organisations** and help them attain legal status, in order to operate freely especially in hard-to-reach areas

ANNEX G: AGENCY TABLES AND DIAGRAMS

This section shares tables and diagrams summarising the *current* and *potential* agency ratings of different actors across the SP processes (framing, design, delivery and learning) and component building blocks. The Agency Spectrum was used to score local and international actor ratings of agency.

Key: 0-3 = Omitted | 4-6 = Consulted | 7-9 = Co-responsible | 10-12 = Primarily responsible

FRAMING

Table G1: FRAMING SP Programmes: International Actor Perceptions

SP FRAMING Building Blocks	Local NGOs		GESI Actors		Government Actors		CBOs		International actors	
	Current	Potential	Current	Potential	Current	Potential	Current	Potential	Current	Potential
Developing Programme objectives	3	8	4	8	3	4	0	0	12	11
Establishing governance & coordination	4	9	5	9	4	5	0	3	12	11
Mapping locations, risk & vulnerability	6	10	6	9	6	6	2	7	11	10
Deciding SP priorities	3	9	5	9	4	5	0	5	12	10

Table G2: FRAMING SP Programmes: Local Actor Perceptions

Social Protection Building Blocks	Local NGOs		GESI Actors		Government Actors		CBOs	
	Current	Potential	Current	Potential	Current	Potential	Current	Potential
Developing programme objectives	8	10	6	9	6	7	3	5
Establishing governance & coordination	8	10	5	8	7	8	3	7
Mapping locations, risk & vulnerability	9	10	6	9	7	8	2	6
Deciding SP priorities	8	10	5	9	6	7	2	7

Figure G1. FRAMING: International Actor Perceptions



Figure G2. FRAMING: Local Actor Perceptions



DESIGN

Table G3: DESIGNING SP Programmes: International Actor Perceptions

Social Protection Building Blocks	Local NGOs		GESI Actors		Government Actors		CBOs		International actors	
	Current	Potential	Current	Potential	Current	Potential	Current	Potential	Current	Potential
Developing targeting criteria	7	10	6	9	3	4	0	5	10	10
Designing conditionality of assistance	6	9	5	8	3	4	0	5	10	10
Deciding beneficiary entitlement	6	9	4	6	4	5	0	0	9	10
Deciding on transfer processes	6	9	5	7	2	4	0	3	9	10

Table G4: DESIGNING SP Programmes: Local Actor Perceptions

Social Protection Building Blocks	Local NGOs		GESI Actors		Government Actors		CBOs	
	Current	Potential	Current	Potential	Current	Potential	Current	Potential
Developing targeting criteria	8	10	5	9	6	7	2	7
Designing conditionality of assistance	8	10	5	9	6	7	3	6
Deciding beneficiary entitlement	6	9	4	7	6	7	3	5
Deciding on transfer processes	8	10	5	7	6	7	3	6

Figure G3. DESIGNING: International Actor Perceptions



Figure G4. DESIGNING: Local Actor Perceptions



DELIVERY

Table G5: DELIVERY OF SP Programmes: International Actor Perceptions

Social Protection Building Blocks	Local NGOs		GESI Actors		Government Actors		CBOs		International actors	
	Current	Potential	Current	Potential	Current	Potential	Current	Potential	Current	Potential
Awareness raising and advocacy	9	11	6	10	2	3	2	10	6	7
Beneficiary registration and verification	10	12	7	8	2	4	0	3	6	6
Service delivery e.g. assistance distribution	9	11	6	7	4	5	4	6	6	7
Managing and setting up digital transfers	5	10	5	6	0	2	0	0	11	10
Implementing case management	8	10	4	7	2	4	2	5	8	9

Table G6: DELIVERY OF SP Programmes: Local Actor Perceptions

Social Protection Building Blocks	Local NGOs		GESI Actors		Government Actors		CBOs	
	Current	Potential	Current	Potential	Current	Potential	Current	Potential
Awareness raising and advocacy	10	10	7	10	7	8	5	10
Beneficiary registration and verification	10	10	7	8	7	8	5	7
Service delivery e.g. assistance distribution	9	10	7	8	7	7	2	6
Managing and setting up digital transfers	7	9	5	7	7	7	1	4
Implementing case management	8	10	6	7	7	7	4	6

Figure G5. DELIVERY: International Actor Perceptions



Figure G6. DELIVERY: Local Actor Perceptions



LEARNING

Table G7: SP Programmes LEARNING: International Actor Perceptions

Social Protection Building Blocks	Local NGOs		GESI Actors		Government Actors		CBOs		International actors	
	Current	Potential	Current	Potential	Current	Potential	Current	Potential	Current	Potential
Designing M&E tools and indicators	7	9	7	10	2	3	0	6	10	11
M&E data collection and analysis	8	10	6	9	2	4	0	6	10	11
M&E reporting	8	10	5	7	2	4	0	0	8	8
Collecting beneficiary feedback	9	11	6	10	2	6	3	8	6	7

Table G8: SP Programmes LEARNING: Local Actor Perceptions

Social Protection Building Blocks	Local NGOs		GESI Actors		Government Actors		CBOs	
	Current	Potential	Current	Potential	Current	Potential	Current	Potential
Designing M&E tools and indicators	9	10	4	8	6	7	1	6
M&E data collection and analysis	9	10	6	9	6	7	1	6
M&E reporting	9	10	6	7	7	7	2	5
Collecting beneficiary feedback	10	10	7	9	7	7	6	9

Figure G7. LEARNING: International Actor Perceptions



Figure G8. LEARNING: Local Actor Perceptions



This document was developed as part of the STAAR -Social Protection Technical Assistance, Advice and Resources facility implemented by DAI Global UK Ltd and funded by the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office. The views expressed in this document are entirely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent FCDO's own views or policies.

© 2022

Copyright in the typographical arrangement and design (of this publication) is jointly owned by the Crown in the right of the United Kingdom. This publication (excluding the logos) may be reproduced free of charge in any format or medium, provided that it is reproduced accurately (in full or in part) and not used in a misleading context. The material must be acknowledged as Crown copyright with the title and source of the publication specified.

Published by STAAR, on behalf of FCDO.